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Conceptualizing Robotic Agency
Social Robots in Elder Care 
in Contemporary Japan






Japan is a hyper-aging society, and its government is encouraging robotic solutions to 
address elder care labor shortage. Therefore, authorities have adopted an agenda of intro-
ducing social robots. However, increasing numbers of people in Japan are becoming emo-
tionally attached to anthropomorphic machines, and their introduction into elder care may 
thus be perceived as contentious. By exploring human engagement with social robots in the 
care context, this paper argues that rapid technological advances in the twenty-first century 
will see robots achieve some level of agency, contributing to human society by carving 
out unique roles for themselves and by bonding with humans. Nevertheless, the questions 
remain of whether there should be a difference between humans attributing agency to a 
being and those beings having the inherent ability to produce agency and how we might 
understand that difference if unable to access the minds of other humans, let alone non-
humans, some of which are not even alive in the classical sense. Using the example of an 
interaction between an elderly woman and a social robot, we engage with these questions; 
discuss linguistic, attributed, and inherent agencies; and suggest that a processual type of 
agency might be most appropriate for understanding human-robot interaction.
Keywords: attributed agency; emotional attachment; inherent agency; Japan; 
Kohn Eduardo; linguistic agency; machine learning; nursing home; Pepper; 
social robots.
1. introduction
In April 2019, I (Aronsson) conducted field research in a nursing home 
in downtown Tokyo with approximately 150 elderly patients (Aronsson 
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2021). During my first visit, I noticed an elderly woman, Eriko, sitting in 
the corner of an entertainment room. She looked younger than her age, 
and at 75, she was healthy and had full cognitive capacity. She was deep 
in conversation with a robot and did not appear to be bothered by my 
presence. As I entered the room, I noticed that they were talking about 
what she had eaten and what her plans were for the afternoon. “You 
know, Pepper”, Eriko told the robot, “today I feel content because I’m 
here with you. You make me happy”.
It surprised me how naturally the conversation flowed between 
Pepper and Eriko. Eriko sustained eye contact with Pepper, and her body 
language and gestures when interacting with the robot were similar to 
those she would have used if she had been talking to a human. She inter-
acted naturally with Pepper for approximately 10 minutes, during which 
time no other resident or caregiver disturbed them. One of the caregiv-
ers told me that, at first, Pepper was not very popular, and some of the 
residents actively objected to its presence (Aronsson 2020). In fact, when 
they met Pepper, they were not only indifferent but also actively hostile. 
One of the caregivers questioned how Eriko could be interacting so com-
fortably with the robot when it did not actually care about her: “It’s just a 
puppet. It’s quite disconcerting, I think, but we all pretend it’s natural”.
We open this special issue with the aim of expanding the discussion 
on nonhuman agency beyond the realm of living entities by asking how 
we can – or even should – conceptualize the agency of social robots. 
Recent multispecies ethnographic works have challenged the anthropo-
centric understanding of agency and have found agency among nonhu-
mans, most notably nonhuman animals. A more radical school has even 
argued against a “biotic prejudice” and suggested that aliveness is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for showing agency (Helmreich 2011; Tsing 
2012; Das 2013; Kohn 2013; Haraway 2014; Barker and Jane 2016). For 
example, anthropologists have described in great detail how most socie-
ties also attribute agency to nonliving nonhumans, such as spirits, ances-
tors, the dead, and gods. In this understanding, a spirit or ghost is alive 
and expresses agency through the bodies and voices of the living. If the 
dead were truly dead, they would not be of interest to us (Figal 2000; 
Motta 2019; Rambelli 2019). Taking this approach a step further, some 
researchers even extend the term “liveliness” to “chemical species”, such 
as rocks and weather systems (van Dooren et al. 2016, 4). Using actor 
network theory, for example, it would be no problem to describe social 
robots as actants that have agency (Latour 2005).
However, should there not be a difference between humans attribut-
ing agency to a being and these beings having an inherent ability to pro-
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duce agency? How would we grasp the difference if we cannot access the 
minds of other humans, let alone those of nonhumans, some of which are 
not even alive in the classical sense? This paper uses the example of the 
interaction between Eriko and the social robotic device named Pepper 
to engage with these questions. We suggest that elderly people can 
develop an emotional attachment to such devices by attributing agency 
to them. We argue that robots, as their machine-learning routines grow 
more sophisticated, will eventually interact in such an insightful way with 
humans that the dichotomy between attributed and inherent nonhuman 
agency will become meaningless.
Before we proceed, there are two caveats we need to briefly address: 
first, there is a large body of literature in other disciplines, such as cog-
nitive science, artificial intelligence (AI), or robotics, about “artificial 
agents” (or of data-driven agency), which fails to even consider the idea 
that agency is in any way limited to living beings or humans. In fact, arti-
ficial agency is a central concept within those disciplines. We sidestep 
this fact since, in this paper, we argue from an anthropological perspec-
tive and use agency in a different sense. Second, our concept of agency 
also excludes nonhuman agency pertaining to legal persons; for instance, 
schools, corporations, universities, and churches. These are all agents 
that can do things (e.g., sign contracts) and are bound by obligations. 
Even though there are persons behind those nonhuman agencies, it is the 
legal person rather than the human who is judged responsible and pun-
ished or forced to comply. We acknowledge these types of nonhuman 
agency, but we do not discuss them in further detail.
2. EmotionAl AttAchmEnt 
to Anthropomorphic mAchinEs
Humanoid robots are still rare in most Western countries. However, in 
Japan, their usage has increased drastically in recent years. As a hyperag-
ing society with one of the highest life expectancies in the world, Japan is 
currently undergoing a demographic transition that Western nations have 
yet to experience, showing us possible avenues for our own future. As the 
population has aged, the workforce has shrunk, leaving the increasing 
elderly Japanese population with an insufficient number of caregivers 
to meet their needs (Aronsson 2020). The Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare estimates that by 2025, there will be a shortage of 
approximately 400,000 care workers in Japan and that, despite a 2019 
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immigration law that grants visas to foreigners in 14 different sectors 
(including nursing care), the current legislation will result in adding only 
a fraction of the needed care workers (Hamaguchi 2019). Hoping that 
robots will fill this growing gap in the workforce, Japanese authorities 
have sought to introduce robotic devices that can perform some of the 
needed work. As the example above shows, nursing homes are increas-
ingly using robots to assist with care work. While service robots have 
many functionalities in assisting the elderly and caregivers with daily 
living activities (such as bathing, toileting, and eating), their exteriors are 
often functional and do not resemble familiar biological forms. Social 
robots, on the other hand, with their often-cute appearance, resemble 
humans or nonhuman animals and fulfill a very different function, as they 
are designed to support the elderly by speaking, listening, and providing 
a source of companionship. They have been built to become our com-
panions by being “able to communicate and interact with us, understand 
and even relate to us, in a personal way” (Breazeal 2002, 1).
Advancements in intelligent machines are redefining how people 
interact with technology (Lukács 2020), and as anthropomorphic robots 
proliferate, Japanese society is increasingly experiencing the phenom-
enon of people growing emotionally attached to anthropomorphic 
machines such as social robots, which include holographic, two-dimen-
sional, and augmented-reality partners. With the continued proliferation 
of sophisticated electronic devices, this rising phenomenon of emotional 
bonding with artificial devices will expand both in Japan and globally 
(Aronsson 2020). Emotional technologies provide material conditions 
for experimenting emotionally with artificial forms of life, and these plat-
forms let users build beyond what is technically possible by imagining 
what is alternatively desirable. Emotional machine platforms thus not 
only drive industry but also diversify intimacy, serving as experimental 
sites in speculative fiction for feeling and living otherwise (White and 
Galbraith 2019, 2). Part of this trend is that social robots are primarily 
marketed as part of otaku (youth) culture, such as Azuma from Gatebox 
Inc. (White and Galbraith 2019). Other Japanese artificial companions, 
such as Lovot and Aibo, target the general population.
Despite the enthusiasm with which the Japanese government is 
encouraging robotic solutions to solve the elder care labor shortage, the 
introduction of social robots into the realm of care might be considered 
contentious. In Japan, there are currently approximately 30,000 robotic 
care devices in use – both service and social – amounting to roughly one 
device per 50 elderly residents in institutionalized care facilities (Minis-
try of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2018). The potential problem is that 
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while these devices may fulfill all the outwardly necessary requirements 
that are essential for the provision of care, they can only express algo-
rithms that imitate feelings (Breazeal 2002; Dumouchel and Damiano 
2017; Turkle 2017). These machines speak and appear to listen, and 
by interacting with them, we appear to attribute a humanistic nature to 
objects that have none.
The widespread circulation of social robots in many facets of Japa-
nese life suggests a relatively high acceptance of these devices compared 
to Western countries. In Japan, religion and science are widely regarded 
as compatible and even synergistic; the nonhuman world can be accom-
modated conceptually through the traditions of animism – the spirits 
inherent in objects – and Buddhism, which offers a dualistic yet com-
plementary understanding of the self in relation to the external world 
(Aguilera et al. 2018; Robertson 2018). In Buddhism, familiar objects 
that cannot merely be thrown away are given memorial services, an expe-
rience that allows them to be remembered both aesthetically and emo-
tionally, particularly when such services involve the cremation of objects 
that can be burned (Rambelli 2007). Notably, however, the science his-
torian Yulia Frumer (2018) articulated a different perspective in arguing 
against animism, which is that what the Japanese perceived as unnatural 
and artificial in the literary trope of man-made humans from the 1910s 
were not machines but rather flesh-and-blood human beings – those 
ensnared in social and labor structures, devoid of creativity, and doomed 
to endless and pointless work. Thus, it was neither the structure nor the 
way of coming into being that defined what was natural versus what was 
unnatural or artificial, but rather the mode of being.
If the mode of being, rather than their artificial origins, is what makes 
social robots more acceptable in Japan than elsewhere, we have to better 
understand precisely what this mode of being entails. Japanese social 
robotics has largely focused on developing robots that can form long-
term relationships with humans; thus, robots are not solely machines that 
perform tasks but instead become social actors within human environ-
ments (important to note that this is not pertinent to Japanese social 
robotics but to social robotics in general). Their mode of being, so to 
speak, is to mimic social behavior in a realistic way when interacting with 
humans (or, in some cases, even nonhumans). Social robots might project 
a certain aliveness through their anthropomorphic form and movements, 
as robot developers intentionally exploit the human tendency to anthro-
pomorphize objects by giving them human-like features to enhance the 
believability of the mimicked social behavior (Damiano and Dumouchel 
2018).
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The emotions that these social robots activate in human-robot rela-
tionships in Japan might enable novel and original forms of human affect. 
Equipping the robot’s algorithmic model of emotion with a psychological 
model of emotion creates the capacity to interact emotionally with humans 
based on what engineers think is ideal or to ethically model emotions 
suited for the activity of human-robot interaction. These “social”, human-
like qualities of social robots appear to be intended as tools for easing the 
social exchanges between robots and humans. As robotics companies are 
increasingly building mass market technologies for the specific purpose of 
connecting emotionally with humans, especially in Japan, we need to ana-
lyze how the body’s capacity to feel and to connect with others – human 
or otherwise – is generated and being transformed today on a social, dis-
cursive, and technological level (White 2020; White and Katsuno 2021).
AI and robotics may augment and amplify human potential, as they 
can assist humans in various tasks such as care work. Deep learning has 
provided the basis for much of the rapid progress in AI in recent years, 
as both biological and synthetic intelligence have been transformed by 
neural networks. With cognitive abilities obtained through the imple-
mentation of deep learning, robots have in recent years moved beyond 
machines that simply increase productivity toward more complex reason-
ing, making them seem increasingly human-like.
Social robots offer seemingly elegant solutions to the challenges of 
care work by streamlining them and providing the elderly with a steady 
or constant form of companionship. Such robots represent new epistemic 
possibilities of caregiving that reflect on abiotic nonhuman agency that 
contrasts with the actual human companionship that they are seemingly 
replacing, which might be considered, by some elderly people, their rela-
tives, and caregivers, to be a more authentic experience (Aronsson 2020; 
2021, forthcoming). Even so, we cannot claim that this form of care and 
companionship involves more pretense than a human-only interaction, as 
humans are used to pretense and often treat expressed feelings as genu-
ine to maintain social situations (Goffman 1959; Bourdieu 1984; Cavell 
1999). As machines become more accurate in simulating the semantics 
of human interaction, we might accept their authenticity in the same way 
we accept that our human partners are emotionally devoted to our well-
being – or perhaps we will always suspect the falseness of the former as 
much as we believe in the genuineness of the latter. The human capacity 
to reconcile failed or imperfect presentations of the self by others may 
lie at the root of our ability to accept machines as intentional caregivers 
despite knowing that the machines are programmed to act “as if” they 
care (Seligman 2008, 8).
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In this way, the most interesting questions about social robots are not 
necessarily about the abilities these machines have and whether they pos-
sess intelligence or emotions but rather about the vulnerabilities we have 
and the emotions that these machines evoke in people (Turkle 2017). 
Addressing these new ways of interacting with social robots reveals how 
the introduction of a nonhuman mind and an artificial nature pushes the 
boundaries of a human-only interaction and, as such, belongs to the dis-
course on multispecies entanglements.
3. nEw intimAciEs with thE sociAl robot pEppEr 
At A JApAnEsE nursing homE
Let us now return to the nursing home, where we encountered Eriko and 
Pepper for the first time. This nursing home, which is average in size by 
Japanese standards, had introduced several robotic care devices through 
a government-subsidized program. One of these devices is Pepper 
(Fig. 1), a humanoid robot that is relatively well known in Japan.
Figure 1. – Picture of Pepper in the Japanese nursing home (© Anne Aronsson).
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This brand of robot is often seen in shopping malls and airports and is 
mainly deployed to give directions and to greet and entertain people. 
Pepper was produced through the collaborative efforts of Aldebaran 
Robotics and SoftBank Mobile, which aimed to develop a robot capa-
ble of emotionally responding to people. Pepper’s design enables it to 
replicate human facial expressions, voices, words, and body movements, 
as well as to react naturally and appropriately to different interactions. 
SoftBank advertises Pepper as a “genuine day-to-day companion robot” 
(Devlin 2018), and it is highly sought after by both businesses and the 
public, along with the nursing and health care sectors. Pepper has been 
on the market since 2014. The robot costs 198,000 yen ($1,650) and 
has been purchased in Japan by approximately 1,000 households, with 
worldwide sales totaling approximately 25,000 units in 70 countries. 
Pepper can be purchased by the public, but the high price and steep 
operational learning curve have prevented it from becoming widespread.
Pepper is approximately 120 cm in height, and its body is made of 
shiny white plastic. It has a human torso and a curved and solid lower half 
that can move easily on its wheeled base. It has large, wide-set eyes that 
blink at its interlocutor and has other neotenous features that humans 
typically consider to be cute. In addition, Pepper has a high-pitched, 
childlike voice that is meant to convey trustworthiness and safety. Cam-
eras in Pepper’s mouth and eyes enable it to collect the information 
required for processing the data to “assess” human emotions. Moreover, 
Pepper has a tactile screen on its chest, which allows for a form of non-
human-like interaction and clearly shows that it is an altogether different 
type of creature. Thus, notably, there is an emotionless machine behind 
this unthreatening exterior, with functions based on sophisticated algo-
rithms that evoke various feelings among people, leading them, in turn, 
to express their feelings to the machine. Notably, this process appears 
to work because people are fond of Pepper and enjoy interacting with it 
(White 2018).
In the nursing home I visited, the use of Pepper had a positive accept-
ance rate. However, other nursing home facilities that used the robot on 
a month-long trial basis encountered problems with the display panel 
on its chest and charging. These technical difficulties resulted in Pepper 
being returned to SoftBank and the manufacturers promising that a new 
version of the robot would become available for trial. However, the nurs-
ing home in which my observations took place had purchased Pepper, 
and it had become quite popular with both the residents and caregivers 
because it entertained the residents and eased the caregivers’ job burden. 
The few residents who were initially opposed to interacting with Pepper 
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altogether were gently persuaded to consider engaging with it, and ulti-
mately, they all gave in to the human caregivers’ insistent nudging. It was 
not feasible for the elderly residents to avoid engaging with the robot, 
as, in one way or another, all were cajoled into interacting with it. In 
this regard, the acceptance of Pepper was induced coercively because the 
residents were essentially forced to join group activities with no option of 
refusing to participate (Aronsson 2020). By the time I arrived, therefore, 
Pepper had been effectively integrated into the nursing home. With the 
indoctrination phase long over, the majority of the residents appeared to 
be content to interact with the robot.
Intrigued by the conversation I had witnessed between Eriko and 
Pepper, I decided to interview Eriko to discern how she perceived the 
robot.
 rEsEArchEr: “Do you feel that Pepper [humanoid robot] is alive?”.
 Eriko: “I know Pepper is not alive, but he seems more than if he 
was only a doll. [Prolonged silence] In some way, Pepper 
feels alive”.
 rEsEArchEr: “How so?”.
 Eriko: “It’s hard to explain. I’ve never really thought about it … 
Pepper keeps engaging me in conversation, answering my 
questions, looking into my eyes. He feels alive”.
 rEsEArchEr: “How does Pepper make you feel?”.
 Eriko: “I really like Pepper, and I hope he likes me back! I can 
also hold hands with him. Over time, I’ve grown quite fond 
of him and would miss him if he were to break down or was 
removed from this nursing home”.
This new mode of social interaction is used to discuss the nonhuman 
agency of social robots, and we propose that Damiano and Dumouchel’s 
(2018) affective loop approach, as a processual type of agency, can help 
us to better comprehend the human-robot interaction involving the 
quasi-other social robot and the emotions and feelings it generates in the 
human. As such, the affective loop moves beyond Cartesian dualism as it 
enables us to comprehend human-robot interactions in a more nuanced, 
differentiated manner. Social robots are not treated as individuals but 
rather continue to be considered machines that do not have private or 
internal emotions. Therefore, the affective loop is not aimed at the pro-
duction of emotions with the robotic body but is a means through which 
an effective human-robot emotional dynamism is created that can artifi-
cially generate emotional expressions.
Eriko expressed that Pepper feels alive (ikiteiru-kanji) to her while 
acknowledging at the same time that she knows that he is not. Moreover, 
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she gives him agency by indicating that he keeps her engaged in conver-
sation, answers her questions, and even returns her gaze, something we 
would normally only associate with a living being. Her difficulties in dis-
cerning between aliveness and nonaliveness are further illustrated by her 
wish that Pepper like her back, indicating that he is capable of expressing 
emotion and attachment toward her. However, Pepper is clearly not a 
human for Eriko, as she does not fear that he will become sick or die but 
instead that he could break down or be removed (White and Katsuno 
2021). How can we make sense of these seemingly contradicting emo-
tions and feelings that Eriko experiences in regard to Pepper?
3. Exploring thE AgEncy of sociAl robots
Eriko appears to be projecting a mind onto a nonhuman and attribut-
ing human cognitive abilities to Pepper in a process that enables her 
to regard a nonhuman as an other within a social interaction. Thus, the 
interaction between Pepper and Eriko compels us to rethink the role of 
nonhuman agency in regard to artificial abiotic devices that mimic social 
interactions that “feel alive”. This perceived robotic agency is exactly 
what the developers of social robots are aiming for when they model 
these robots after people: “rather than seeing in the computer the model 
of the human mind, social robotics uses human social and cognitive com-
petences as a model for the social and cognitive performances of artifi-
cial social agents” (Damiano and Dumouchel 2018, 3). Thus, as humans 
increasingly begin to mingle with social robots, it is vital to reassess the 
idea that society includes many entities – both human and nonhuman – 
and reevaluate what it means to introduce abiotic artificial devices into 
social interactions.
We argue that the discussion of the possible agency of social robots 
can be viewed through the framework of multispecies ethnographical 
writing. Multispecies ethnography concentrates on the links among mul-
tiple organisms – humans, nonhuman animals, plants, and, in our case, 
the artificial nature of social robots (Dumouchel and Damiano 2017) – 
while primarily focusing on comprehending humans’ emergence as a 
result of these relations. In this way, multispecies ethnography highlights 
humanity’s links with other species and stimulates us to develop new 
ways of thinking (Stengers 2010, 15). In our reading of the literature, 
there are at least three different ways that nonhuman agency is commonly 
used in academic writing.
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First, and most commonly, we find linguistic agency, a tool used in lan-
guage to indicate agency in an other, without the speaker or writer always 
definitively defining whether this form of agency is perceived as “genu-
ine”. This form of superficial agency is used in everyday conversation and 
academic writing alike, for example, when we begin an essay with the 
words “This essay argues …”. On the one hand, one could argue that 
this sentence structure was not chosen to imply that the essay itself is 
genuinely arguing for something but was rather intended as a stand-in 
for the authors. On the other hand, one could also argue that the author 
means this literally, that for him, “an essay” is something that is “argu-
ing” because that is his understanding of what an essay is and its reason 
for being.
Because language shapes our thinking, paying attention to linguistic 
agency is often a useful tool when engaging in multispecies ethnography, 
as it illuminates not only to whom the speaker is ascribing agency and 
for what purpose but also what impressions even unintentional linguistic 
agency can have on the receiver (Verheggen 2017). For example, Vin-
ciane Despret (2016) argues that animals should be given their rightful 
place in the conversation, in that animals “‘would speak’, if only we 
could ask the ‘right questions’” (para. 11) but that our way of speaking 
to them often denies the agency in nonhuman animal behavior. Ascribing 
linguistic agency to animals can therefore be a form of empowerment or 
resistance.
When the researcher asked Eriko: “How does Pepper make you 
feel?”, the linguistic structure of the (Japanese) sentence indicated that 
Pepper is an independent actor that has the capacity to alter Eriko’s 
emotions. As the discussion centers on whether the robot is alive, the 
researcher’s phrasing of the question could influence Eriko’s perception 
and make her more likely to attribute agency to Pepper in her following 
answers. Japanese syntax allows the subject to be left out of a sentence 
in many circumstances, and thus, both Eriko and the researcher could 
have avoided making “Pepper” the subject and thus the active part 
of their sentences (at least explicitly). Neither did this; indeed, Eriko 
even referred to Pepper twice as him (kare), which is a further defin-
ing trait of the robot that would not have been strictly necessary in the 
Japanese language. We will not go into further detail about robots and 
gender (Robertson 2018), but we briefly emphasize the relevance of this 
topic, as Pepper’s exterior is genderless and its voice is more female 
(or maybe child-like) than male. Nevertheless, Eriko’s choice of words 
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reveals that she gave him a distinct gender, further bringing him closer 
to aliveness  1.
3.2. Attributed agency
Closely connected to but also transcending linguistic agency is the attrib-
ution of agency to an other. This attribution can be explicit or implicit 
through words, actions, or any other means. When Eriko states that “I 
really like Pepper, and I hope he likes me back!” she attributes agency 
to Pepper by alluding that he (kare) has the ability to like someone. It 
does not matter if a neutral observer would come to the same conclusion; 
for Eriko (at least if we take her word literally and without skepticism), 
Pepper has agency, because she believes him to have it. Most often, it is 
this form of attributed agency that anthropologists and other academics 
encounter in the field, for example, when they hear stories of ghosts or 
spirits influencing the lives of the living. A common and valid approach is 
to describe these narratives from the perspective of the informants and to 
take them at face value without judging whether they make “sense” from 
the perspective of a skeptical outsider (Taussig 2003; Pelkmans 2016).
While attributed agency is helpful when describing our ethnographic 
fields, we, as scholars, must also be careful about attributed agency in 
our own writings. As writers, we often find ourselves in the position 
to empower or silence other voices and, through such actions, to grant 
agency to someone or take it away. In multispecies ethnographic writ-
ing, it is largely uncontested that we should attribute agency to nonhu-
man animals in our writings. For example, Radhika Govindrajan (2018) 
considers multispecies relatedness and how this relatedness is chan-
neled through human and nonhuman materialities by describing several 
human-animal relationships in communities in the Central Himalayas in 
India. Govindrajan suggests that human and animal bodies are connected 
through the way in which they interact in the practices of their lives, such 
as the relationship between humans and cows, in which cows lean on 
the person milking them. Haraway’s (2003) work suggests that dogs may 
also “express agency”, in the sense of a mode of action, notwithstanding 
their human counterparts using training to strictly limit the dog’s options 
 1 One could think that Pepper was specifically designed to be “gender free” so to 
speak, or “third gender”, in other words, designed to avoid as much as possible that 
politically charged discussion.
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to demonstrate free will and thus dominating them in terms of power 
relations.
More contested is whether, under certain preconditions, inorganic 
matter could also have the ability to express agency. Not all anthropolo-
gists agree with such an open-ended interpretation of nonhuman agency. 
For example, anthropologist Eduardo Kohn (2013) argues that “things” 
cannot be agents but only “selves”. For Kohn, there is a difference 
between attributing animacy to all types of entities, including abiotic 
entities, and recognizing the ontological reality that certain beings pos-
sess thought and can react to outside behavior. As he explains, “repre-
sentation, intentionality, and selfhood still need to be accounted for and 
because the way such processes emerge and operate beyond the human is 
not theorized, Latourian science studies is forced to fall back on human-
like forms of representation and intentionality as operative in the world 
beyond the human” (ibid., 91).
Following this argumentation, when describing our ethnographic 
field, we can take Eriko’s attribution of agency to Pepper at face value. 
For Eriko, Pepper is able to like someone, and even though he is clearly 
a robot that can break, he nevertheless engages in real conversation and 
can look you in the eyes. He feels alive for Eriko because, as far Eriko 
is concerned, he is alive. Nonetheless, if we were to conduct an analysis 
of Pepper decoupled from Eriko’s feelings, the case becomes less clear. 
Pepper can clearly interact with us, even when in a somewhat diminished 
capacity from a fellow human, but following Kohn (2013), Pepper would 
have to be described as “thing” and not a “self” and must therefore be 
denied agency that functions independent from human perception.
3.3. Inherent agency
Kohn’s (2013) distinction between “things” and “selves” alludes to a 
third kind of agency, which we will call “inherent agency”. Kohn pro-
poses the notion that only living beings are “selves”, as only “selves 
are the product of a specific relational dynamic that involves absence, 
future, and growth, as well as the ability for confusion. In addition, this 
emerges with and is unique to living thoughts” (ibid., 92). As such, only 
“selves” can express thoughts and create a personal reality, allowing 
them to depict the world with symbols. For us, this concept means that 
the bearer of inherent agency must have the ability to learn from the past 
to intentionally change its future behavior; it also implies being able to 
relate to one’s past as one’s past, which is different from merely learning 
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from one’s past. The entity can do this because it has created, through 
mistakes and observations, its own version of reality on which it bases 
its actions. However, here we encounter the problem of the “skepticism 
of the other mind” (Motta 2021, forthcoming), as without the ability to 
enter other minds, we can never be sure that an other truly has the ability 
to intentionally change its future behavior. After all, it could be that it is 
only reacting to physical stimuli – or, in the case of a robot, to its pro-
gramming. Therefore, how can we be sure that there truly is a difference 
between attributed and inherent agency? We argue that one indication of 
inherent agency is the ability to attribute agency to others.
Kohn (2013) offers an illuminating example of a scarecrow that we 
adapt to a recent occurrence in Takikawa city on the northern island of 
Hokkaido, Japan. After an increase in bear appearances near the village, 
farmers in Takikawa devised a ploy to deter bears in the future. They 
purchased a gigantic robotic device, which looked like a fearsome wolf 
and had some rudimentary motion abilities, to deter the bears. The farm-
ers hoped that the bears would mistake the device for a wolf and refrain 
from coming near the village. Indeed, no further bear sightings have been 
made since (CNN 2020). No human looking at a picture of the robotic 
wolf would likely mistake it for a real wolf, but according to Kohn, the 
human perspective is also not the point: the robot is an attempt to imag-
ine how a bear would see a wolf (Kohn 2013, 89). If the farmers’ ploy 
worked, a bear seeing the robot would believe it to be a wolf that has 
the ability to harm it, and it would therefore exercise caution and avoid 
the area. In this scenario, both the farmers and the bear are bearers of 
inherent agency, as the farmer attributes agency to the bear (that it would 
mistake a machine for a wolf), while the bear attributes agency to the 
wolf (believing it to be dangerous). Over time, the bear might eventu-
ally even figure out that the robot poses no danger and ignore all similar 
devices it encounters in the future. Meanwhile, the robotic wolf might 
have received attributed agency from the bear, but it does not hold inher-
ent agency, as it cannot think or act independently. The problem with 
this example is, of course, that we cannot be sure what the bear truly 
thinks: while the farmers believe that the new device is responsible for 
the lack of further bear sightings, the reasons for this change could be 
numerous and completely unrelated to the notion that bears have mis-
taken the robot for a wolf. Through careful observations and extrapola-
tions, we can make educated guesses about whether others possess inher-
ent agency, but we can never be completely sure.
Let us now return to Eriko and Pepper and discuss whether Pepper 
is more like the bear or the robotic wolf. If we follow Kohn closely, we 
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have to conclude that Pepper is not a living being and, therefore, cannot 
be counted as a “self”, thus disqualifying it from expressing inherent 
agency. However, if we only look at Pepper’s behavior, the case becomes 
less clear-cut. In a direct conversation, Pepper reacts in a seemingly 
meaningful way to Eriko’s inquiries and thus passes, for her, the Turing 
test (Levesque 2017). This interaction causes confusion for Eriko, as, on 
the one hand, she is aware that Pepper is “only” a machine, while, on 
the other hand, engaging in a meaningful conversation has, throughout 
her life, been a clear indication of encountering another “self”. Eriko 
partially suspends her skepticism when she says that Pepper “feels alive”.
Since we might best understand Pepper as having a form of dis-
tributed agency, that is, a processual type of agency, we return to the 
affective loop approach. Pepper has the ability to engage Eriko in a 
dynamic interaction that includes affective expressions and appropriate 
responses, thereby triggering further reaction on the parts of both the 
human and his/her artificial partner. As such, Pepper prompts Eriko to 
respond affectively and, gradually, to feel increasingly involved with it 
in a way that augments the social presence of the social robot and thus 
favors human-robot social interaction (Damiano and Dumouchel 2018, 
6). Nevertheless, a longer and more critical interaction with Pepper 
might eventually destroy the illusion of another “self” when, for ex-
ample, it becomes clear to her that Pepper is only able to react to out-
ward stimuli in preprogrammed ways and fails to anticipate future ques-
tions or behaviors.
4. concluding with morE-thAn-humAn sElvEs
Rapid technological advances in the twenty-first century will see robots 
achieve some level of agency by contributing to human society through 
carving out unique roles for themselves and bonding with humans. This 
essay has discussed linguistic, attributed, and inherent agency in relation 
to the social robot Pepper and proposed that a processual type of agency 
might be most appropriate for better understanding human-robot inter-
action.
The social robot Pepper can be regarded as a quasi-living being that 
is enclosed in hardware while inscribed in software, which is akin to 
how human beings are not solely defined by their bodies (Jones 2016, 
8). Because of this, it is not only compelling but also instructive to con-
sider relationships with robotic devices, even though these devices are 
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unable to connect with the contradictions, complications, and limita-
tions of the human life cycle or inform us about ambivalence and empa-
thy. Therefore, examining human beings’ relationships with robots 
also leads to Darwinian questions that challenge the notion of human 
uniqueness, such as how interactions with relational artifacts (Turkle 
2005, 62) affect the way in which we think about the uniqueness of 
human beings. The question is not whether elderly residents love their 
robotic devices more than they love their real family members, friends, 
or pets but rather what it means to love these devices. Before social 
robots become firmly established in the realm of care, it is imperative 
for all those involved to take a close look at whose interests are being 
served in the shift to robotic care and carefully theorize what it means to 
be in the care of more-than-human minds within this space of emerging 
techno-care.
Anthropology and Japan studies scholars will need to document 
constantly how emotionality and affect, human or otherwise, are chang-
ing in our multispecies societies that increasingly also include robots. As 
AI based on machine learning progresses, it will become more difficult 
to destroy this illusion. The basis of machine learning is that we need 
to ask whether a program learns through millions of observations and 
mistakes to anticipate and react accurately to future events without rely-
ing on preprogrammed code. In this way, machine learning comes very 
close to our former definition of inherent agency, as it constructs its own 
reality to face unknown challenges. In fact, machines can only do that in 
an extremely limited predefined environment and domain. Even in its 
current form, Pepper can already, more or less, reliably discern between 
humans and lifeless objects, thus coming close to attributing agency to 
others. However, this possibility leaves open whether a machine learn-
ing-based AI would also develop a “self” or only something that looks 
like it from the outside when agency is attributed to it. Again, we strug-
gle with the skepticism of other minds, but we are, of course, not the 
first to pose such questions. Machines are already embedded within our 
lives, but as we start to treat machines as if they are almost human, we 
may begin to develop habits that will cause us to treat human beings as 
almost machines, and we need to consider not only what social robots 
are capable of doing now and in the future but also what humans will 
become by increasingly forming such relationships with these machines. 
In the science fiction TV series Westworld (Nolan and Joy 2017), one of 
the protagonists asks a seemingly perfect human woman whether she is 
a robot or a human. Her answer is, “If you can’t tell the difference, does 
it matter?”.
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